Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination: The GAO Study in Perspective by Briggs, Vernon M., Jr.
Cornell University ILR School 
DigitalCommons@ILR 
Articles and Chapters ILR Collection 
12-1-1990 
Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination: The GAO 
Study in Perspective 
Vernon M. Briggs Jr. 
Cornell University, vmb2@cornell.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles 
 Part of the Human Resources Management Commons, Labor and Employment Law Commons, and 
the Labor Relations Commons 
Thank you for downloading an article from DigitalCommons@ILR. 
Support this valuable resource today! 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the ILR Collection at DigitalCommons@ILR. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@ILR. For more 
information, please contact catherwood-dig@cornell.edu. 
If you have a disability and are having trouble accessing information on this website or need materials in an 
alternate format, contact web-accessibility@cornell.edu for assistance. 
Employer Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination: The GAO Study in 
Perspective 
Abstract 
"The enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) produced the most extensive 
legislation in the area of employment law in the United States in two decades (i.e., since the adoption of 
the Occupational Health and Safety Act of 1970). Its provisions affect every employer and every job 
seeker since the law went into effect on November 6, 1986. Among its multiple provisions were strictures 
designed to prohibit employers from hiring illegal immigrants. This action had the effect of repealing the 
'Texas Proviso' of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that specifically exempted the employment 
relationship from constituting any charge of harboring illegal immigrants who were found on an 
employer's premises." 
Keywords 
GAO, study, discrimination, human, resource, ILR, reform, control, IRCA, United States, legislation, law, 
employment, employer, employ, job, seeker, provision, prohibit, illegal, legal, immigrant, harbor 
Disciplines 
Human Resources Management | Labor and Employment Law | Labor Relations 
Comments 
Suggested Citation 
Briggs, V. M., Jr. (1990). Employer sanctions and the question of discrimination: The GAO study in 
perspective [Electronic version]. The International Migration Review, 24, 803-815. 
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/8/ 
Required Publisher Statement 
Published version posted with special permission of the copyright holder, Blackwell Publishing. 
This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: https://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/8 
DOCUMENTATION 
Employer Sanctions and the 
- Question of Discrimination: 
The GAO Study in Perspective 
Vernon M. Briggs, Jr. 
Comzell University 
The enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) 
produced the most extensive legislation in the area of employment law in 
the United States in two decades (i.e., since the adoption of the Occupational 
Health and Safety Act of 1970). Its provisions affect every employer and every 
job seeker since the law went into effect on November 6 ,  1986. Arnong its 
multiple provisions were strictures designed to prohibit employers from 
hiring illegal immigrants. This action had the effect of repealing the "Texas 
Proviso" of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 that specifically 
exempted the employment relationship from constituting any charge of 
harboring illegal immigrants who were found on an employer's premises. 
All employers are required to complete an Employment Eligibility Verifica- 
tion Form (1-9 form) for each new employee. All prospective job holders are 
required to provide their employers with the documents needed to prove their 
eligibility for empioy~nent and to attest to their eligibility to work by signing 
the 1-9 form. The employers are not responsible for the authenticity of the 
documents that are presented but they are required to exercise good faith in 
their examination of these materials. Civil penalties are specified for employers 
who do not comply with the documentation requirements or who knowingly 
violate the hiring ban. Escalating fines and criminal penalties are set forth for 
repeat offenders. Job applicants are subject to fines and imprisonment if they 
use false docuinents to secure ernployinent but there are no penalties on those 
workers who are hired and who are later found to be ineligible to work. 
THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION 
The adoption of the employer sanctions system raised fears in a number of 
quarters that it could introduce a new opportunity for employinent discrim- 
ination to occur. Hispanic American groups in particular and other 
concerned persons as well, worried that the sanctions might cause employ- 
ers to be too cautious in their hiring practices. To protect themselves from 
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possible violations, employers might r e fhe  to hire "foreign-looking" appli- 
cants or persons who "speak with accents" even if such job applicants were 
citizens or resident aliens or, in some cases, certain foreigners who are 
legally eligible to work under certain prescribed circulnstances (e.g., foreign 
students). It is also, of course, possible that employers could use the sanctions 
as a false pretext to mask a purposeful desire to discriminate against hiring 
individuals from certain minority groups. 
To address these concerns, IRCA strengthened the existing law on dis- 
crimination on the basis of national origin as provided by the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. IRCA amended the existing Imxnigration and Nationality Act 
to also include a prohibition against national origin discrimination. A new 
Office of the Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employxnent 
Practices (OSC) was established within the U.S. Department of Justice to 
hear these types of complaints and to prosecute offenders. Furthermore, the 
coverage of the prohibition against national origin discrimination under 
IRCA was written to apply to employers of four to fourteen employees- 
unlike the coverage for racial, gender, national origin or religious charges 
of discrimination under the Civil Rights Act which extends only to employ- 
ers of fifteen or inore workers. Workers covered under the Civil Rights Act 
may not file charges of national origin discrimination with the OSC. They 
must use the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 
THE ISSUE OF CITIZENSHIP DISCRIMINATION 
The politics associated with the adoption of IRCA-linked employer sanctions 
with four separate amnesty programs that would permit many of the illegal 
immigrants in the country at that time to adjust their status to become 
resident aliens and, after the normal five year waiting period, to becoxne 
naturalized citizens if they so desire. The amnesty provisions were by far 
the most controversial sections of the new law. In the final floor debate on 
IRCAin the I-Iouse of Representatives, an amendment to delete the amnesty 
provisions was defeated by a narrow seven-vote margin. Had this move 
succeeded, the disparate political coalition required to pass IRCA would 
have collapsed and the bill would have died. Many congressinen who 
supported amnesty, opposed sanctions and visa versa. 
The relationship of amnesty to the topic of employment discrimination 
is complicated but it is crucial to understand. Opponents to amnesty strongly 
felt that such action would reward law breakers and punish law abiders. 
Those persons who had unlawfully entered the United States without 
inspection or who overstayed their visas by remaining in the country after 
their visas had expired were being given the opportunity to become citizens. 
On the other hand, prospective immigrants who respected U.S. law by 
remaining in their countries while applying through the legal channels to 
DOCUMENTATION 805 
immigrate face the certain prospect of lengthy delays (due to the extensive 
backlog in all admission categories) or the likely denial of eligibility under 
the existing admission preferences (which provide access only to those who 
have a family relative who is a U.S. citizen or resident alien or to those who 
have specific job occupational skills that are in short supply). To the many 
opponents of amnesty, this sit~lation seemed patently unfair. 
Because of the strength of this opposition, the supporters of the amnesty 
concept feared that a significant number of employers might manifest their 
disdain for amnesty recipients by refusing to hire them while they were in 
the mandatory status of being resident aliens. In a phrase, they could be 
discriminated against in their efforts to become employed. Such discrimina- 
tion was perfectly legal prior to IRCA as there was no existing ban on 
discrimination on the basis of alienage or citizenship ( i . e . ,  resident aliens are 
not citizens despite the fact that they may legally be employed). The potential 
harm from citizenship discrimination, of course, could conceivably extend 
far beyond the several million persons who availed themselves of the benefits 
of IRCAs amnesty provisions. It could engulf the several million other 
resident aliens who live and work in tlie United States, who entered the 
country legally or as refiigees and who are required to remain in the status 
ofpermanent resident aliens for at least five years. Many permanent resident 
aliens never go through the formal naturalization proceedings. They seek 
only to work in the United States while retaining their foreign citizenships 
in the event that they soineday decide to return to their homelands. 
To address these concerns, IRCA introduced a new civil rights protection. 
It prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship by any employer of 
more than three workers. IRCA is the only federal law to ban citizenship 
discrimination. An interesting feature of tlie new provision, however, is that 
it specifically states that employers may always give hiring preference to a 
citizen job applicant if tlie citizen and noncitizen applicants are viewed as 
being equally qualified. Such absolute preferences for one group relative to 
another are not available under the Civil Rights Act. The protection against 
citizenship discrimination applies to the public as well as to the private sector. 
But in tlie public sector an important exception is made that greatly limits 
its scope. Namely, in government employment, certain jobs may be desig- 
nated by law, regulation, executive order, or government contract to be filled 
only by citizens. There are many such restrictions; therefore, both the federal 
and state levels of government legally remain in effect (Briggs, 1984:Ch. 4). 
THE REQUIREMENT TO ASSESS POSSIBLE 
DISCRIMINATORY INFLUENCES 
Controversy swirled around the possible discriininatory effects of employer 
sanctions throughout the entire time that immigration reform was pending 
806 INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION REVIEW 
before Congress. In 1982, when Congress first began to consider the topic 
as part of a compreliensive immigration reform package, Representative 
Frank (D-MA) sought to have an antidiscrimination amendment incorpo- 
rated in the legislation that emanated from tlie House of Representatives. 
He was successful on each occasion over tlie next four years that a bill 
reached the House floor. In the final debate on IRCA in the House on 
October 9, 1986, the Frank Amendment survived a motion to delete its 
provisions by a vote of 140 to 260. 
In the Senate, however, the need for such protections was consistently 
resisted. Senator Siinpson (R-WI'), a coauthor of IRCA, opposed the inclusion 
of such language. He indicated that the Frankhnendment was one of the most 
"troublesome" issues on which the Senate had ultimately to accede in the 
Congressional conference bill that reconciled differences between tl1e I-Iouse 
and Senate versions of IRCA (Montweilel; 1987:50-51). Simpson and other 
legislators not only questioned the need for such provisions but they also feared 
that the provisions could become yet a new way to harass employers. Despite 
last ditch efforts to have it deleted, it became apparent that inclusion of these 
provisions was "quite necessary for final passage" (Montweiler, 1987:51). 
In signing IRCA into law, however, President Ronald Reagan took the 
highly unusual step of simultaneously issuing a detailed statement that set 
forth the Administrations's interpretation of the antidiscrimination provis- 
ions of tlie new law. It stated that the standard of proof, that aggrieved 
individuals had to bring to the Office of the Special Counsel, would require 
individual complainants to establish "discriminatory intent" as opposed to 
"disparate impact" as permitted under the Civil Rights Act. It also stated 
that attorney fees would be assessed in all cases where claims did not have 
"a reasonable foundation in law or in fact" as well as in those cases "found 
to be vexatious or frivolous" (Montweiler, 1987:51). Thus, without belabor- 
ing the point, it is fair to say that the issue of the possible discriminatory 
effects of elnployer sanctions was one of tlie most contentious issues in the 
entire immigration reform drive. 
As it would take experience before it would be known if there was actual 
need to fear such consequences, IRCA contained a requirement that the 
Comptroller General of the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) study 
the implementation of tlie employer sanctions requirement. The study was 
to isolate any "new" or "increased" discrimination that might be "solely" 
attributable to the implementation of tlie sanctions. The mandate was to 
study national origin discrimination and also citizenship discrimination if 
such actions have tlie purpose or effect of discriminating on the basis of 
national origin. Interim reports were specified with a final report due after 
three and one half years of the enactment of IRCA. The final report was 
directed to answer three questions: 1) are the sanctions an unfair burden on 
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einployers; 2) has the systein of sanctions been satisfactorily carried out; and 
3 )  have the sanctions resulted in  the creation of a pattern of discrimination 
against eligible workers? 
Depending on the findings of the final report a potential sunset (i .e. ,  
repeal) provision for the entire sanctions system was written into the law. If 
the GAO answered the third question in the affirmative (i.e., that sanctions 
have resulted in a pattern of discrimination), the mere passage of a resolu- 
tion within 30 days of the issuance of the report by both houses of Congress 
approving tlle findings would autoinatically repeal the entire employer 
sanctions system of IRCA. Hence, there was an  unusual air of anticipation 
surrounding the release of this particular GAO document. 
THE ISSUANCE OF THE REPORT AND ITS PRINCIPAL 
FINDINGS 
On March 29, 1990, the GAO issued its report (US.  General Accounting 
Office, 1990). I n  answer to the first of the mandated questions, GAO found 
that the verification requirements of IRCA had not unnecessarily burdened 
employers and that the sanctions were serving to reduce the magnitude of 
illegal immigration which was the ultimate goal of the legislation. With 
respect to the second question, it found that the government agencies 
responsible for iinpleinenting the sanctions program (i.e., U.S. Immigration 
and Naturalization Service [INS] and the U.S. Department of Labor [DOL]) 
have "satisfactorily" carried out their duties to educate employers and to 
identify and fine violators. As for the third question, the report found that 
national origin cliscriinination resulting froin IRCA "while not pervasive, 
does exist a t  levels that amount to more than 'just a few isolated cases' and 
constitutes a 'serious pattern of discrimination"' (U.S. General Accounting 
Office, 1990:5). Accordingly, the report did "pull the trigger" that provided 
Congress with the option to repeal the sanctions program by resolution 
within 30 days. Congress could also, of course, choose to leave the sanctions 
systein alone o r  to amend IRCA in  order to reduce the magnitude of 
IRCA-related discrimination. 
THE PROCESS FOR MEASURING IRCA-RELATED 
DISCRIMINATION 
There is no issue more difficult to measure in a free labor market than the 
effects of employment discrimination (Marshall and Briggs, 1989:Ch.17). 
No employer is obligated to hire any particularjob seeker; no job seeker is 
required to work for any particular employer. Distinguishing between the 
normal ways in wliich an  employer culls the available labor pool to find the 
most qualified labor force from ways in which illegal acts of discrimination 
may bias outcome decisions is no simple feat (Doeringer and Piore, 1971 :Ch. 
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7). It is important, therefore, to examine how GAO elected to conduct its 
mandated study as a prelude to assessing the confidence of its findings. 
GAO used six different methods to ascertain the information it needed 
to render a conclusion on the relationship of IRCA to any ensuing discrim- 
inatory pattern. Briefly stated, they consisted of 1) a stratified random 
sample survey of 9,491 employers nationwide to determine how hiring 
practices were affected by the advent of employer sanctions; 2) a "hiring 
audit" of randomly selected employers in two cities (Chicago and San Diego) 
to see how specific job applicants were treated; 3) a worker survey of 300 
judgmentally-selected job applicants in five cities that have high concentra- 
tions of immigrants in their populations to compare the hiring experiences 
of "foreign-sounding applicants" with those of "nonforeign-sounding appli- 
cants"; 4) a time series analysis of the number of national origin 
discrimination charges received by the EEOC from 1979 to 1989 to see if 
there had been any substantial increase in complaints; 5) a review of the 
nature of the discrimination charges received by the newly created OSC 
from May 1988 to May 1989; and 6) an analysis of state employment service 
data in Illinois, Florida and Texas to compare the job placement experiences 
of non-Hispanic whites, blacks and Hispanics. 
Although GAO did not assign any weights to the various sources of 
information it collected, it is clear from the disproportionate discussion in 
the report that two of the data sources were particularly important to the 
final determination of the presence of discriminatory impact. These were 
the employer survey and the "hiring audit." 
THE NATURE OF THE DISCRIMINATORY FINDINGS 
With regard to the actual findings, the responses to the employer survey 
revealed that 19 percent of the surveyed employers introduced discrimina- 
tory hiring practices because of tlie law. Of these, 10 percent of the 
employers adopted employment practices tliat discriminated on the basis of 
a person's "foreign appearance or accent" ( i .e . ,  national origin discrimina- 
tion) and 9 percent initiated employment practices that discriminated on 
the basis of alienage (i .e. ,  citizenship discrimination). 
To be specific, the new hiring practices that had the effect of causing 
national origin discrimination were those where employers adopted policies 
to 1) examine documents selectively of only those current employees who 
had foreign appearances or accents; 2) refrain froin hiring job applicants 
who had foreign appearances or accents; 3) refuse to hire persons who 
provided Puerto Rican birth certificates; 4) require completed 1-9 forms for 
only some newly hired persons but not others; and 5) use foreign appear- 
ance or foreign accent as a precondition to examining documents before 
making any decision about possibly hiring a job applicant. These discrimi- 
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natory employer practices were found to exist most often in cities with high 
percentages of Asians and Hispanics in their populations. There was, how- 
ever, no particular pattern found in the incidence of such practices between 
sinall-, medium- or large-sized employers. The discriminatory hiring prac- 
tices that had the effect of causing citizenship origin discrimination consisted 
of new policies that were implemented to hire only persons born in the 
United States or to refrain from hiring persons who have only temporary 
work eligibility. 
As for the "hiring audit," GAO contracted with the Urban Institute of 
M'ashington, D.C. to have 16 college students apply forjobs in Chicago and 
%an Diego. Called "testers," all were men between 16 and 24 years of age. 
They were divided into eight pairs. Each pair of testers was "matched as 
closely as possible on 1) education, 2) work experience and 3) oral commu- 
nication skills" (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990:30). The biographies 
of the applicants were sometimes altered to make them appear as nearly 
equally qualified as possible. The Urban Institute staff coached the appli- 
cants in training sessions to give similar answers to hypothetical questions 
that an employer might ask. The only purposeful difference between the 
two ineinbers of each pair was that one tester was foreign-looking and 
foreign-sounding and the other was not. That is to say, one was Hispanic; 
one was an  Anglo (i .e. ,  a non-Hispanic white). GAO admitted that employer 
decisions as to which specific person was offered a job and which was not 
could still be related to some characteristic that is not related to the national 
origin of an applicant. Nonetheless, it felt that, if an aggregate pattern of 
differential treatment of Hispanic applicants emerged, it would be an 
indication of national origin discrimination. 
A total of 360 employers were audited by these pairs of fictitious job 
applicants. The applicants were responding to want-ads placed in local 
newspapers. Generally speaking, they were for low wage, entry level jobs. 
Three outcolnes were compared for each employer: the job application 
stage, offers for an interview, and the actual receipt of a job offer. In over a 
majority of the cases (58%), there was no discernible difference between the 
experiences of the members of each pair. Of the remainder, however, 31 
percent of the Hispanic interviewees encountered unfavorable treatment 
while 11 percent of the Anglo interviewees were treated unfavorably. Thus, 
GAO found that I-lispanics were "three times as likely to encounter unfa- 
vorable treatment" as Anglos and concluded on this basis that "the hiring 
audit results show a high level of national origin discrimination" (U.S. 
General Accounting Office, 1990:47). GAO admits that it is "unclear" why 11 
percent of the Anglo interviewees encountered unfavorable treatment under 
such circuinstances. 
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As for the other sources ofinformation, the analysis of charges of discrim- 
ination filed with the OSC revealed that about one fourth of those reviewed 
pertained to some aspect of the employer sanctions provisions. The most 
prevalent allegation involved discrimination by employers who refused to 
accept certain documents used to verify worker eligibility. Likewise, the 
survey of 300 job applicants in five cities with high immigrant populations 
revealed a pattern of differential employee verification experiences applied 
to foreign-sounding persons versus nonforeign-sounding persons. The per- 
sons with foreign accents were more likely to be asked to show documents 
and not be offered the job; to be asked for eligibility documents during the 
job interview; or  to be asked to complete an 1-9 forin before being hired 
than were persons without accents. Interestingly, however, the foreign- 
sounding persons were much more likely to have been actually offered a job 
(69%) than were the nonforeign-sounding persons (40%). The explanation 
for this seeming paradox is that the pools from which interviewees were 
chosen were not comparable. Hence, GAO could not draw any interpreta- 
tive conclusion about any discriminatory behavior as to who would be more 
likely to be actually hired based on this survey. As for the other two measures 
that were reviewed, the study of placement rates by state employment 
services and a time series comparison of national origin discrimination 
charges filed with the EEOC from 1979 to 1989, did not show any evidence 
of IRCA-related discrimination. 
EXPLANATIONS FOR THE FINDINGS 
The GAO offered three explanations for the "widespread pattern of discrim- 
ination" that it found to have been caused by employer sanctions: many 
elnployers lacked an adequate understanding of the inajor provisions of 
IRCA, were uncertain about the proper means to determine worker eligi- 
bility, and were confused about what to do if they suspected that the 
documents they were presented with were counterfeit or  fraudulent. 
The way to overcome einployer ignorance of the terms of the law is 
through continual educational efforts by INS and DOL. GAO recommended 
that their efforts be expanded. As for the confnsion over the means to 
determine worker eligibility, it stemmed from the fact that seventeen 
different docuinents can be used to establish eligibility. Several of these 
approved documents are uncoininon so it is not surprising that many 
employers would not accept thein. The employers who responded to the 
einployer survey strongly favored a reduction in the number of such 
docuinents and GAO concurred. As for the issue of counterfeit and fraudu- 
lent documents, the verification requirements of IRCA requires that 
employers judge the validity of the documents that are presented. Thus, 
because of the multiplicity of documents that can be used and the common 
knowledge that fake identification is readily available, some employers 
preferred to "err on  the safe side" and decided not to hire foreign-looking 
or foreign-sounding job applicants. Thus, it was not so much a case of 
malevolence by einployers as i t  was ignorance and fear that led to the 
pattern of IRCA-related discrimination found by GAO. 
There is, of course, also the possibility that the GAO study itselfwas faulty 
in its measurement of discriminatory effects. Most of the various informa- 
tion in the GAO report revealed errors of process or misunderstanding over 
what was required. The employer responses were, understandably, largely 
defensive actions or overreactions in the face of uncertainty and confusion 
about what to do. There were few indications of purposeful actions to use 
IRCA as an instrument to camouflage discri~ninatory intent. The  lone 
exception to this conclusion, however, was the data provided by the direct 
"hiring audit." Here there seemed to be some evidence-although not 
overwhelming-of differential treatment based directly on national origin. 
The validity ofthe discriminatory findings of the hiring auditis basedentirely 
on the assumption that the two job applicants (one Hispanic and one Anglo) 
were indeed equal in every important respect other than their obvious ethnic 
differences. If the members ofeach team could notbe perceived as being closely 
matched, any finding pertaining to discrimination is open to question. In fact, 
GAO ackno~vleclges that it was not possible to control for the "psycl~ological 
traits" of the inernbers ofeach teain that may have affected an employer's hiring 
decision which inay have had nothing to do with ethnicity itself (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 1990:47). But even more serious complaints have been 
made by Peter Skerry ofthe American Enterprise Institute (Skerry, 1990:A-12). 
He requested and was given permission to view the training tapes of the 
matched pairs of interviewees. Afterward, he stated: 
I viewed a videotape in which the 16 individual testers introduced 
themselves and described their educational backgrounds. I was struck 
by the number of instances in which the Anglo testers attended more 
selective universities and displayed inore self-assurance than their 
I-Iispanic counterparts. Indeed, the Anglos generally appeared to have 
a social class advantage over the Hispanics which would explain mucla 
of the "discrimination" encountered by the latter (Skerry, 1990:A-12). 
Thus, the data source that provided the most direct implication of the 
existence of a pattern of national origin discri~nination has been called into 
serious question. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
As the 30-day period in wl~icll Congress could have voted to repeal the 
sanctions program has passed without any action taken, the remaining 
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options are to do nothing or to initiate legislative actions to mitigate the 
opportunities for discrimination to occur. Bs the GAO report made serious 
charges and-despite criticisms over its methodologies-it does represent 
the most impartial and the most comprehensive study yet conducted on the 
effects of IRCA on employer hiring practices, it seems clear that prevailing 
policy changes are needed. Indeed, the GAO report reinforces the similar 
findings of less ambitious state studies conducted by the California Fair 
Employment and Housing Commission, the New York Interagency Task 
Force on Immigration Affairs, and the Arizona Civil Rights Advisory Board 
(for summaries of these reports, see, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
1990:84-86). The common thread in these state studies was that IRCA had 
caused employers to refuse to accept or to be uncertain about the validity 
of certain work eligibility documents which they were presented. 
In this vein, the call by GAO for a continuation of educational efforts by 
INS and DOL of employers is absolutely necessary. Likewise, the recom- 
mendations for DOL to reinspect employers who have been found to have 
hired illegal immigrants in violation of IRCA's provisions and for efforts to 
develop an automated sanctions information system to monitor the pro- 
grain are definitely in order. GAO also suggested that Congress act to reduce 
the number ofwork eligibility documents and to make those documents that 
are acceptable more counterfeit proof and less vulnerable to fraudulent use. 
Certainly, these suggestions should be taken seriously. 
There is also another loophole in IRCA that, if closed, would enhance the 
effectiveness of the employer sanctions program itself. It was not discussed 
by GAO but it warrants consideration; namely, tllought should be given to 
the imposition of fines and/or criminal penalties against the illegal aliens 
themselves who are found to be employed despite the existence of the 
sanctions system. As Barry and Carinel Chiswick have observed, "any 
attempt to enforce the iininigration laws with virtually no cost to the law 
breaker is destined to perpetuate the revolving door" (Chiswick and 
Chiswick, 1985:A-20). Such penalties would reinforce an impression of 
commitment by the nation to the principle of employer sanctions. It might 
also contribute to a reduction in the flow of illegal aliens. 
THE OMITTED ISSUES: 
PROIMMIGRATION DISCRIMINATION 
The topic of discrimination and immigration policy has another dimension 
that has yet to be examined. Its influence is equally as pernicious as those 
concerns raised in the GAO report. Namely, the systematic discrimination 
by employers in favor of immigrants-legal or illegal-to the detriment of 
citizen workers. This discrimination usually involves decisions by einployers 
who are of a particular ethnic background to hire only immigrants who are 
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of the saine ethnic background. The effect, of course, is to deny opportuni- 
ties for citizens, resident aliens, and other persons eligible to work from 
having the opportunity to be employed. As the number of immigrants 
continues to rise in both absolute and relative terms, the collective conse- 
quences of such employer discrimination mount. This is especially the 
situation in many major urban labor markets. 
It is to be recalled that GAO could offer no explanation for the fact 
that 11 percent of Anglo interviewees in the hiring audit encountered 
unfavorable treatment that could be related to IRCA requirements. One 
plausible explanation is that the Alglos were discriminated against by 
employers because they were citizens or were not of a particular national 
origin. All of the interviews took place in two urban areas with large 
foreign born populations. All of the interviewees were applying for entry 
level and relatively unskilled jobs. It is quite possible that the Anglos 
encountered ethnic employers who would not hire Anglos (e.g., Hispanic 
or Asian employers who only wanted to hire Hispanic or Asian workers). 
This may also explain the reason why, in the study used by GAO to 
determine the experiences of foreign-sounding persons, these persons 
had a considerably higher job placement than did the nonforeign-sound- 
ing job seekers. 
Because the topic of proiininigrant discriinination in contemporary times 
has never been carefully researched, the indications of the presence of such 
bias are fragmentary. Nonetheless, there are strong indications of its exis- 
tence. In a very proimmigrant study of immigration in New York City, 
Elizabeth Bogen noted the phenomenon when she candidly wrote: "there 
are tens of thousands ofjobs in New York City for which the native born are 
not candidates" (Bogen, 1987:91). The reasons she cites are that "ethnic 
hiring networks and the proliferation of immigrant-owned small businesses 
in the city have cut offopen-market coinpetition forjobs" (Bogen, 1987:91). 
Quite perceptively, she strongly suggests that the blatant "discrimination 
against native workers is a matter for future monitoring." Given the mount- 
ing racial tension in many urban communities between citizens (especially 
African Americans) and recent immigrants, the need for such research on 
this subject is long overdue. Likewise, research in those rural labor markets 
where immigrant workers have become a significant factor--e.g., in the 
agriculture industry of the Southwest-has also noted the widespread use 
of ethnic networking which dominates the hiring process (Mines and Mar- 
tin, 1984:144). The negative effect on the employment of native born 
workers for these rural jobs is the saine in its results as it is in urban labor 
markets. The concept of networking is highly praised by many scholars who 
study the current immigrant experience. But what is overlooked in these 
studies is that most of these practices-especially those of ethnic employ- 
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ers-are absolutely illegal. What is the difference between "ethnic network- 
ing" which is often lauded and "the old boy system" which is roundly 
condemned by antidiscrimination advocates? 
In earlier waves of immigration, networking served to aid in the assimi- 
lation process of immigrants. But those immigrants entered the United 
States prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Times in the 
United States have changed-hopefully for the better. Today any employ- 
nnent practice that purposely excludes opporrunities for native born workers 
is illegal conduct and it should be stopped. Unfortunately, the contemporary 
politics associated with immigration policy at  tlie federal, state, and local 
level has been reluctant to address tliis issue. The GAO report-which has 
nothing to say about this issue at all-may have opened a door of opportu- 
nity wliich will allow all aspects of the discrimination issue, as it relates to 
the presence of immigrants in the labor market, to be addressed. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
The GAO study has made a inajor contribution to efforts to assure that fair 
play in the labor market occurs. Its findings, while open to debate as to tlie 
actual magnitude, do show that there is a problem with the existing em- 
ployer sanctions system. There have been unintended adverse consequences 
that go beyond being inere technical violations. There is a necessity for 
greater clarity for employers who are on the front line of the hiring process. 
Fewer and more secure documents that cannot be counterfeited or  fraudu- 
lently used are mandatory steps. Perhaps the positive implications of a single 
national identification system should be explored once again-despite the 
clear prohibition against such a system currently in IRCA. Likewise, the use 
of lines for illegal aliens who have somehow defied the employer sanctions 
should also be considered. 
In any event, the nation is indebted to Congressinan Frank for his 
perseverance to have had the antidiscriinination provisions built into IRCA. 
It  is to be hoped that if Congress elects to ainend IRCA that the employer 
sanctions system will not he weakened, but rather that it will be made 
simpler for employers to understand. It would also help if Congress would 
balance its concern for stopping discrimination against foreign born persons 
eligible to work by native born employers with an  equal interest in assuring 
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